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General Forum: Current 'Affairs' | | "Did Godhra Save Pakistan?" Col Athale on Rediff | |
| Either a dove or lion it has to protect it's self.
We have to have a strong defence all the time depending on our capability, budget and technology.
Posted by: Mr. M Kumar N At: 4, Mar 2005 12:44:57 PM IST
Either a dove or lion it has to protect it's self.
We has to have a strong defence all the time depending on our capability, budget and technology.
Posted by: Mr. M Kumar N At: 4, Mar 2005 12:44:13 PM IST
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Indian Army chief, General S Padmanabhan, went public with an explicit threat on January 11, 2002.
'As long as I am alive, if nuclear weapons are used against India, or Indian forces, or the forces in the seas, or our economic interests, the perpetrator of the particular outrage will be punished, punished so severely that his continuation in any fray will be in doubt,' the general said.
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Wow, General Saab! Wonderful!
How I wonder if all of us, citizens, be as brave as our soldiers are!
But the painful reality is 'India is really a dove'. It never threatens either. I wonder if Pakistanis ever frighten at the sight of us.
Posted by: Ms. Prasanthi Uppalapati At: 3, Mar 2005 11:54:00 PM IST
GODRA incident was a mystery until 2004.
Godra Mystery was solved by Mr. Lalu Prasad yadav, railway minister. many CD's were released regarding this fatal incident.
Posted by: Mr. M Kumar N At: 3, Mar 2005 11:12:21 PM IST
A few things do sound exaggerated though!
Posted by: Malakpet Rowdy At: 3, Mar 2005 4:11:11 PM IST
Part 2: Did Godhra Save Pakistan?
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'Rumours of an attack on a temple spread like wildfire. Ahmedabad city was put under curfew. Yet the violence did not stop. The local police were accused of showing anti-Muslim bias and were ineffective. After two days of unsuccessful attempts at stopping the violence, the city of Ahmedabad was handed over to the army.'
'Two trains were stopped, Muslims were pulled out and killed. The rioting had spread to Mehsana, Surat, Anand and Jamnagar and Rajkot, the birth place of Mahatma Gandhi. Even the Sabarmati ashram, established by Mahatma Gandhi, was not spared and was attacked by a rampaging mob. It was only after 10 days that the situation was finally brought under control. It was estimated that over 1,500 people were killed while thousands left their homes in panic and sought refuge in temporary camps.'
-- A report on the Gujarat riots, not in 2002, but in September 1969.
'We had begun to get reports of scattered violence shortly after we had watched on television the barbaric video tape of motorists being ripped out of their cars, hammered, pounded and chased by rock-throwing men on the ground. The image of a man being pulled from his truck by thugs still burned in my mind. My memory was seared by the vivid imprint of the motionless, beaten man lying on the ground, being kicked and brutalised.
'I was still filled with rage at the sight of one of the assailants picking up a large piece of cinder-block and throwing it at his apparently lifeless body, smashing him in the head. Then, after the savage beating, the attacker appeared to do a dance, raise his hands towards the helicopter overhead and flashed a victory sign.'
'As our helicopter circled over the city, we could see that fires were breaking out over a widespread area. The dark plumes of smoke were ominously spreading to different spots of the city. Firemen could not respond to many of these early fires because snipers were shooting at them. Later police escorts went in with the fire fighters to protect them from the snipers.'
-- Los Angeles, early evening of April 29, 1992. The riots, provoked by a video clipping of police brutality, lasted over a week.
The Gujarat riots of 1969 were far more serious than the 2002 riots. The death toll, as a proportion of population was far higher and the violence had spread to many parts of the state.
What the synopsis of two events shows is:
Police brutality and prejudice are not uncommon during riots.
People show great brutality during riots.
In a tinder box-like situation, like the one in Ahmedabad in 1969 and in Los Angeles in 1992, all that is required to start violence is a trigger event.
Serious riots have always needed Army/National Guard intervention to bring them under control.
The Gujarat riots of 2002 were important as well as unique in a sense.
The country was at that time on the brink of war with Pakistan. On the earlier two occasions, 1965 as well as 1971, remarkable internal peace had prevailed.
In 1971, despite the well known fact that the Pakistan army had killed close to 300,000, mainly Hindus, in Bangladesh (a figure accepted by the official Hamidur Rehman commission as well -- Pakistan General Gul Hasan who was chief of the army at the time claims that over 600,000 were killed), there was no internal strife as all parties (including the much reviled RSS) were co-opted in keeping this secret.
Ninety percent of the nearly 1 crore (10 million) refugees that poured into India were also Hindus. But even this was successfully hidden from the public.
The Godhra incident and the Gujarat riots were the first instance when internal conflict erupted even during an external threat.
There have been many claimants to credit for avoiding war in the subcontinent in 2002, the year when for ten long months the Indian armed forces were poised on the Indo-Pak border.
Colin Powell, then the American secretary of state, has gone on record to claim that it was the efforts and influence of the United States that averted war in the sub-continent.
If the US is so influential with the Indian government, one is tempted to ask, then why did it not succeed in preventing the nuclear tests at Pokhran in May 1998?
American multinationals who outsource their work to the Bangalore-based IT industry claimed it was their threat to withdraw which forced Indian companies like Infosys and Wipro to lobby with the government in favour of peace and restraint.
While there is some truth in these assertions, it is likely it was the Godhra incident and the riots that followed in March 2002 that really saved Pakistan from being attacked by India.
Complete coverage: The Gujarat riots
Godhra (and its twin city of Dahod) is famous in the subcontinent as the birthplace of Aurangzeb, the fanatical Mughal emperor. It is also a well known trouble spot that has seen violent riots between Hindus and Muslims for over a hundred years. A large number of people of Godhra have links with people in violence-prone Karachi in Pakistan.
On February 27, 2002, when the Sabarmati Express arrived at Godhra railway station early in the morning, it carried the usual load of Hindus returning from Ayodhya, a Hindu pilgrimage centre.
These pilgrims travel in large groups. They often act rowdily and altercations with vendors is a common occurrence. In fact, most vendors are known to shut shop when such trains approach.
But February 27, 2002 was unusual.
No sooner had the train left the station, it was stopped by pulling the emergency chain, just a little distance away from the station. Here the train was surrounded by a mob of thousands that pelted stones at the passengers.
Apparently some people then entered bogie S-6, which had mainly women and children, by cutting the cloth partition between two bogies. They then poured petrol into the carriage and set it afire. 59 people, including women and children, were burnt alive.
The incident had all the hallmarks of a pre-planned attack. The movement of Hindu pilgrims by this train was a regular, routine affair, not a sudden provocation. Also, it is not easy to suddenly garner a mob of several thousand without warning. A fire engine that tried to reach the spot was denied access, indicating a certain degree of leadership and planning.
The question that remains is, why?
Gujarat then and now was ruled by a Hindu hardliner who faced a difficult election in a few months time. That he would make capital of this incident was a foregone conclusion.
In less than two days, the city of Ahmedabad erupted in an orgy of violence. The local police either played a partisan role or were woefully inadequate to deal with the rioters. The only option was to call in the army.
But where was the army? Unlike the earlier occasions when the army stationed in Ahmedabad could move in at an hour's notice, this time it took more than two days. The troops earmarked for internal riot control duties were more than 600 km away, deployed on the border and ready for war.
To re-adjust the defences took time. The troops flown into Ahmedabad did not have transport and were unfamiliar with the geography of the city. It took them nearly three days to bring the situation under control.
Most of the killings and violence took place before the army was deployed. Sporadic arson and violence did continue, but the worst was over within a week.
In normal times, the army could have been deployed in a day.
For instance, army units in Delhi and Meerut (40 km away) were ready to move in within hours of the riots sparked off by the assassination of Indira Gandhi on December 31, 1984. But the then government deliberately delayed deploying it.
This was certainly not the case in 2002, when the delay was caused due to the logistical difficulties involved in redeploying troops from the border.
The brain behind the Godhra incident knew it would trigger riots, which in turn would force such a redeployment. In fact, an entire division (40,000 soldiers) had to be moved, while another division was kept on alert to move into other areas if necessary.
The effect on Operation Parakram
On an average, a division covers close to 50 to 75 km of border. The loss of close to two divisions obviously weakened the Indian threat of action against Pakistan.
'Indian forces were ready for raids into Pakistan'
Let us look at the sequence again.
59 people are burnt to death in a well-planned attack at Godhra.
The 'secular' media and some political parties try to minimise the tragedy, with some going to the extent of blaming the victims.
The Gujarat government brings the charred bodies to Ahmedabad and makes every attempt to inflame religious passions. This combination of 'secular' apathy and government exploitation creates a fertile atmosphere for mass hysteria and revenge killings.
With its 200-year-old history of animosities, the city of Ahmedabad erupts in an orgy of violence. The local police are either biased in favour of the rioters or woefully inadequate to deal with the situation.
Almost two army divisions are withdrawn from border, creating a gaping hole in the defences, weakening the threat of armed action against Pakistan.
It was only towards early May 2002 that the troops rejoined their comrades on the border. By then, the window of opportunity was shut, as the snows in Himalayas would melt, and a Chinese threat had to be factored into the planning.
On May 14, 2002, terrorists struck at Kaluchak in Jammu area. The gruesome attack targeted the wives and children of the soldiers. The sheer audacity of the act was to show to the world India's 'impotence'. The terrorists achieved their aim as thanks to the Gujarat riots, the army was not in a position to react.
In an interview to rediff.com, Major General Ashok Mehta (retd) said: 'Then Kaluchak happened in May and a new D-Day was selected- June 15. On US prodding, General Musharraf made his May 27 speech reaffirming compliance (of Indian demands of curbing terrorist activities).'
The cost of a war that wasn't
It seems clear that the attack on Parliament as well as the Kaluchak massacre were the handiwork of 'freelance' terrorists, nurtured by Pakistan but nor necessarily under its direct control. The aim of terrorists was very clear, provoke a war between India and Pakistan by hook or crook.
But the Godhra incident was a calculated act, organised and executed by Pakistan to save itself from an imminent Indian attack.
As an act sponsored by a State, with all its resources in forensic help, legal expertise and police inputs, it falls in the category of a perfect crime.
No enquiry commission will ever be able to trace the true culprits and solve the mystery of Godhra.
This analysis is based on military logic and understanding of a military mind and not on any insider information. To those who consider this presumptuous, I would cite just one example.
During the First Gulf War of 1991, there was intense speculation over how and from where the Americans launch their ground offensive.
I used to write a daily column for Loksatta during the first Gulf war.
Based on a simple map, knowledge of military history and reading of military mind, I had predicted a week before the actual event the exact pattern of attack.
The prediction was that the 82 and 101 Airborne Divisions would take Al Kurna and Al Nasariya with the Third Army launching an armoured thrust from the west to link up. The Americans would thus cut off the Republican Guard located to the east and south and be poised to drive into Baghdad should Saddam not surrender. I even published a map showing this plan.
In the event I was spot on.
Posted by: Malakpet Rowdy At: 2, Mar 2005 11:40:33 PM IST
Part 1: We were ready to punish Pakistan
__________________________________________
The December 13 attack on the Indian Parliament by Pakistan-backed Lashkar-e-Tayiba terrorists brought the subcontinent to the brink of war.
Despite the campaign of disinformation promoted by the Indian doves, everyone knows the Lashkar is not a secret organisation.
Headquartered at a sprawling campus at Muridke, near Lahore, its annual rallies are attended by a million people. The outfit gets donations from across Pakistan on Muslim festive occasions, and is known to have close relations with the Pakistan army.
Lashkar vows to disintegrate India
Thanks to the bravery of the guards at Parliament and a slice of luck (the car bomb failed to detonate), the attack that aimed at killing/taking hostage a large number of MPs failed, though the vice-president had a narrow escape.
This failure saved the subcontinent from war. It is doubtful if war could have been averted if they had succeeded in their mission.
In the next 48 hours, India ordered the mobilisation of its armed forces and began to move them to battle stations on the Indo-Pak border. The operation was codenamed Parakram.
Under normal circumstances, the armed forces expect at least 7 days notice before being ordered to deploy for war.
That is the job of India's external intelligence agency RAW (Research and Analysis Wing). But this time, both RAW and the Intelligence Bureau (responsible for internal security) were caught napping, and the armed forces had to move without any warning.
India's major strike formations, including the armoured units, are located at least 800 km away from the border. Soldiers stationed in the east are even further away.
The Navy too needs that kind of time to move to battle stations.
The Air Force can be ready relatively quickly, but even they have to reposition maintenance units as per battle plans.
In the best of circumstances, this move to the border and preparations last anything between two to three weeks. Thus it would be fair to assume that the armed forces were ready and raring to go only by the first week of January 2002.
Parakram cost put at Rs 6,500 crore
Neutralising Pakistan's nukes
To be fair, the attack on the Indian Parliament apparently came as a surprise to Pakistan as well. The immediate Indian deployment and threat of conventional attack caught Pakistan on the wrong foot.
Despite its advantage of shorter lines of communication to the border, Pakistan was slow to react to the Indian move. Since India initiated the move towards conflict, it is to be assumed that Indian nuclear weapons were also kept in state of readiness.
While India's stated policy is of no first use, it does not mean we have to wait for the first Pakistani nuke to fall on an Indian city. With satellite and MiG-25 based surveillance in place, India must have been closely monitoring the movement of Pakistani nukes.
Given that Pakistan has a smaller arsenal and also a small geographical area for its deployment, the only chance for Pakistan to use its nuclear weapons is to launch them in a surprise attack without warning and then hope to stall the Indian retaliatory strike with a combination of world pressure for restraint and its own defensive preparations.
In the case of Operation Parakram, as India moved first, a surprise attack was not possible. World pressure now mounted on Pakistan to observe nuclear restraint.
With a huge presence on Pakistani soil and in the Arabian Sea nearby, the Americans were in good position to prevent Pakistan from using its nuclear weapons.
India thus achieved a major success by virtually neutralising Pakistani nukes and gained space to fight a conventional war on its own terms, where it has a degree of superiority.
According to Major General Ashok Mehta (retired) the Indians were ready by January 7, 2002, while Pakistan was still off balance.
Op Parakram: The balance shifts
It is likely that to stall the Indian offensive, around that time, Pakistan may have made some moves to ready its nuclear weapons for use. In response to this then Indian Army chief, General S Padmanabhan, went public with an explicit threat on January 11, 2002.
'As long as I am alive, if nuclear weapons are used against India, or Indian forces, or the forces in the seas, or our economic interests, the perpetrator of the particular outrage will be punished, punished so severely that his continuation in any fray will be in doubt,' the general said.
Indian generals rarely speak, and when they do, the Pakistanis take them seriously.
It appears that the general-speak had the desired effect, and Pakistan lost the nuclear initiative.
General Musharraf's speech on January 12, 2002, accepting some of the Indian demands may well have resulted from this nuclear standoff.
It is obvious that India was not satisfied with Musharraf's concessions. There also may have been a school of thought that this time around India must act.
India was on brink of war twice
India's options
January/February is the ideal time for India to act against Pakistan. Due to the snow bound passes of the Himalayas, the chances of Chinese intervention are minimised. This also enables India to thin out the troops from that border.
But despite the rhetoric of 'Aar Paar Ki ladai' (decisive battle) it seems clear that India may well have wanted to only 'punish' Pakistan, and not destroy it.
There are several options on the J&K border to carry out a limited offensive.
Attacks in the direction of Muzzafarabad or Skardu are well within Indian capability. But doing this could invite a retaliation elsewhere. The Indian deployment all along the border was essentially to forestall this possibility.
Army planned offensive in PoK in January
The most likely scenario worked out in 1987 (during the Brass Tacks exercise) was a Pakistani counterthrust in the Sialkot area. To respond to this India could use its superior tank force to advance in Sindh and cut Pakistan into two.
These moves and countermoves as well as behind the scene diplomacy went on throughout January and February.
With the neutralisation of Pak nukes and the readiness to deal with conventional threat in Punjab by February 2002, the Indian army was well set to 'punish' Pakistan on the Kashmir front.
But then Godhra happened.
Posted by: Malakpet Rowdy At: 2, Mar 2005 11:39:27 PM IST
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